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THE ROLE OF RISK ASSESSMENT IN A 
POLITICAL DECISION PROCESS 
John Lathrop and Joanne Linnerooth 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
How did THAT get THERE? This is a question that mlght come to 
one's lips when driving along a beautiful section of the California coast- 
line, spoiled, suddenly, by a number of large storage tanks. The 
analytically-minded person might suppose that this "place" has become a 
"site" only after an elaborate screening process, where careful tradeoffs 
have been made between the likes of "spoiling h s  view" and other socio- 
economic-technical concerns. The politically-minded person, alterna- 
tively, might wonder who had what connections at what time. 
%he research reported in this paper is supported by the Bundesministerium fuer Forschung 
und Technologic, F.R.G., contract no. 321/75Ql/RGB 8001. While support for this work is 
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Though not explicitly our purpose, we shall begin this paper by con- 
trasting these two W e l t a n s c h a u n g e n  of the siting problem. The analyst's 
single decision maker who balances the welfare and concerns of those 
affected by lus actions does not coincide with the reality of many conflict- 
ing parties who interact in a process that resolves the large problem 
sequentially, where early-on decisions tend to constrain the alternatives 
open for the next decision, and so on. The sequential and adversary 
nature of the process both limits and expands the role that formal ana- 
lyses can play in influencing the decision outcome. 
In this paper, we will demonstrate the ways in which risk analyses 
have been used in a controversial siting issue, the siting of an LNG termi- 
nal in California. The conflicting and contradictory results of these stu- 
dies, we will suggest, is a predictable and important element of the politi- 
cal debate. Not unlike many other areas of scientific investigation, it is 
difficult, i f  not impossible, to arrive at  indisputable scientific truths espe- 
cially where the data is scarce and subjective. Yet, because the risk stu- 
dies are highly quantitative, imitating in some sense technical , engineer- 
ing studies, they generate false expectations regarding the conclusive- 
ness of the results. These studies are often seen as pursuing the truth or 
facts of the situation; yet, they c a n n o t  provide unambiguous facts. For 
this reason, risk analyses should be regarded as introducing necessarily 
ambiguous evidence into the policy process. Viewing the results of a 
study as "evidence" instead of "facts" offers a more realistic perspective 
for improving the uses of these studies, or for improving the studies 
themselves. 
The intent of this paper is to describe the results, interpretations, 
and uses of three risk studies prepared during the course of the 
attempted siting of an LNG terminal in Oxnard. California. The decision 
process is briefly presented in Section 11, and the three studies are 
described in the context of this process in Section 111. In the final section, 
we draw some tentative conclusions regarding an improved role of techni- 
cal analyses in aiding or improving siting decisions. 
II. STING AN LNG TERMINAL IN CALIFORNIA 
Methane, or natural gas, becomes a liquid when cooled to -163'~, 
with a density more than 600 times that of its gaseous phase. Liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) can be economically transported over long ocean dis- 
tances; the economies of scale lead to large ships (e.g., 130,000 m9 LNG) 
and large onshore storage tanks (e.g. 77,500 m3 LNG each) for a base load 
operation such as the one proposed for California. In the event of a s h p  
or terminal accident, a significant amount of LNG could be spilled, which 
would "boil off" into a methane cloud possibly covering a sizeable area 
before igniting and burning. Since the dispersion characteristics of 
methane clouds are poorly understood, there is a great deal of uncer- 
tainty involved in predicting accident consequences. Yet, the present 
state of knowledge indicates that a t  some very low probability an LNG 
accident could result in a cloud covering several miles before igniting. 
Depending on the population density of the area covered by the cloud, the 
possibility exists, albeit at  a low probability, for a catastrophe accident. 
A. THE ANALYST'S PERSPECTIVE 
If a decision analyst were to observe the California LNG siting prob- 
lem, (s)he could characterize it in fairly simple terms. She might view 
the problem as consisting of two decisions: whether or not to import LNG 
and if so, where to site the plant. The decision to import LNG would 
reduce the risk of a shortage of natural gas and improve air quality (due 
to an increased use of a clean-burning fuel). Yet these benefits would 
come at a financial cost (LNG is an expensive form of natural gas), an 
environmental cost (a large facility on the coast) and a cost in terms of 
population safety. Siting the plant at a remote and beautiful part of the 
coast reduces the population risk relative to sitlng the plant in a port, but 
increases environmental degradation and financial cost. As mentioned 
above, in the case of LNG, a great deal of uncertainty surrounds estimates 
of population risk. In addition, estimating the risk of a shortage in 
natural gas involves uncertain projections of demand and supply. In a 
decision-analytic sense, then, the "whether" and "where" decisions involve 
the trading off under uncertainty of natural gas shortage risk, air quality, 
environmental degradation, financial cost, and population risk. 
If we examine the actual political decision process making the LNG 
siting decisions, it may come as no surprise that the process has very lit- 
tle to do with the decision-analytic framework just described. 
B. A DESCRIPTION OF THE DECISION PROCESS 
In the late 1960s, faced with projections of decreasing natural gas 
supplies and increasing need, several California gas utilities began to seek 
additional supplies. In 1974, Western LNG Terminal Company (Western), 
which was formed to represent the LNG interests of the gas utilities, 
applied for approval of three LNG import sites on the California coast: 
Point Conception, located on a remote and attractive part of the coast; 
Oxnard, a port city; and Los Angeles, a large harbor metropolis. The LNG 
would be shipped from Southern Alaska, Alaska's North Slope, and 
Indonesia. As of t h s  writing, Point Conception, the one site remaining 
under active consideration, is still pending approval. This section 
describes the procedures, decisions, and events of this lengthy process 
(for a more complete review see Linnerooth 1980 and Lathrop 1980). 
Though much preliminary work had been done by the California utili- 
ties in negotiating a contract with Indonesia and in preselecting possible 
sites, tor our purposes the process began in 1974, when Western applied 
for approval of three sites: Point Conception (PC), Oxnard (OX), and Los 
Angeles (LA). Ths marked the beginning of the four-round process as 
shown in Table 1, where each Round can be characterized by the problem 
definition as perceived by most if not all of the interested parties.2 by an 
event (proposal, request, etc.) initiating the discussions, and by a 
decision(s) or nondecision concluding the round (For a more detailed 
description of this characterization see Kunreuther, et  al, 1981). 
'This does not preclude the possibility that some parties might object to this definition and 
challerlge it during the course of the debate. 
Table 1. Summary of Rounds i n  the  Cal i fornia  LNG S i t i n g  Case 
ROUND 1 Date 
Problem Def in i t ion:  Should t h e  proposed s i t e s  be approved? 
That is:  Does CalifornianeedLNG, and 
i f  so ,  which, i f  any, of the  proposed 
s i t e s  i s  appropriate? 
I n i t i a t i n g  Event: Applicant f i l e s  f o r  t h e  approval of September 1974 
t h r e e  s i t e s .  (34 months) 
Conclusion : Applicant perceives t h a t  no s i t e  i s  Ju ly  1977 
approvable without a long delay. 
Problem Defini t ion:  How should need f o r  LNG be determined? 
I f  need i s  es tab l i shed ,  how should an 
LNG f a c i l i t y  be s i t e d ?  
I n i t i a t i n g  Event: Applicant and o the r  p u t  pressure  on t h e  July  1977 S t a t e  Legis la ture  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  LNG 
s i t i n g .  (2  months) 
Conclusion: A new s i t i n g  process i s  es tab l i shed  September 
t h a t  assumes a need f o r  LNG, and t h a t  1977 
i s  designed t o  acce le ra te  LNG terminal  
s i t i n g .  
ROUND 3 
Problem Def in i t ion:  
I n i t i a t i n g  Event: 
Conclusion: 
ROUND 4 
Problem Def in i t ion:  
I n i t i a t i n g  Event: 
Conclusion: 
Which s i t e  i s  appropriate? 
Applicant f i l e s  f o r  approval of 
Point  Conception s i t e  
October 1977 
(10 months) 
S i t e  approved condi t ional  on considera- Ju ly  1978 
t i o n  of add i t iona l  seismic r i s k  da ta  
Is Point  Conception se ismical ly  sa fe?  
Regulatory agencies s e t  up procedures t o  
consider add i t iona l  seismic r i s k  da ta .  1 9 8 0  
(Round st i l l  i n  progress)  
At the time Western submitted applications for the three sites, there 
existed a standard and routine process for approving industrial facilities. 
This siting procedure was, however, complex, involving three levels of 
government. The Federal Power Commission was responsible for assess- 
ing national need as well as environmental impact; the local authorities 
were required to grant the various licenses for land use, access, and so 
forth, and the California Coastal Commission (CCC) was mandated to give 
the final approval for any facility on the California coastline. As the appli- 
cation progressed through the approval channels, it became increasingly 
apparent that these routine procedures, especially on the local level, 
were ill suited to handle this large-scale facility with the potential for a 
catastrophic accident. The mismatch between the scale of the project 
and the procedures designed to approve it was aggravated by the novelty 
of the technology. The risks were ill defined, the experts were not in 
agreement on the possible consequences of a spill, and there existed no 
standard operating procedure and regulations. 
From the point of view of formal risk assessments, the first round of 
the California siting process was the most interesting. To support its 
applications to the Federal Power Commission, Western was required to 
submit an analysis of the safety of the facility and its operations. For this 
purpose, it contracted with a consulting firm (Science Applications, Inc. 
(SAI)). As required by State Law, the municipalities were required to sub- 
mit an Environmental Impact report (EIR); of most interest to us here 
was the Oxnard study which was also submitted by a consulting firm 
(Socio-economic Systems (SES)). Finally, the Federal Power Commission 
was required to carry out an in-house Environmental Impact Statement 
(EIS) . 
Though the approval appeared to be a routine matter, the low- 
probability consequences of t h s  large-scale operation complicated the 
process considerably, resulting in the stalemate (at last as perceived by 
Western) concluding Round One. The apparent significance of the risks of 
the planned facility appear surprising in view of the low estimates of 
these risks assessed by Western and the FPC. But the picture began to 
cloud with the discovery of an earthquake fault in the Los Angeles harbor 
and the publication of several worst-case scenarios for Oxnard appearing 
in the SES report. 
Thus in 1977 Western faced a stalemate involving all three levels of 
government. On the federal level, the FPC was in favor of the Oxnard site, 
but the FPC also seemed likely to deny the Port of Los Angeles site on 
grounds of the recently discovered earthquake fault, though this site was 
favored by the local authorities. On the local level the authorities of 
Oxnard seemed increasingly unlikely to approve a terminal, and Western 
faced a complex and lengthy approval process with Santa Barbara County 
which held approval authority over the Point Conception site. On the 
state level, i t  seemed unlikely that the CCC, placing priority on public 
safety, could be convinced that an  LNG terminal was safe enough for the 
Oxnard and Los Angeles populated areas. But the CCC also faced prob- 
lems in approving the remote Point Conception site, where the marine 
life, kelp beds, surfing breaks and spectacular views represented the 
types of resources the CCC was created to protect. To complicate an 
already complex situation, this site was being actively opposed by the 
Bixby & Hollister ranch associations representing people who owned 
neighboring land, and by the Sierra Club, which opposed LNG on two 
fronts: they argued that California did not need the gas, but if it were 
imported the facility should be on a remote site. In summary, Western 
faced the possibility of not obtaining all the needed approvals for any of 
the three sites. 
Anticipating a possible stalemate, Western turned to the California 
State Legislature for help, initiating Round Two of the process. Western 
perceived a better chance in changing the siting process in its favor than 
in fighting the multiple-approval, standard process. Western, supported 
by sympathetic interests (other utilities, business, and labor), success- 
fully brought pressure to bear on the State Legislature to pass the 1977 
California LNG Siting Act (Senate Bill 1081). This legislation concluded 
Round Two (see Table 1) which was effectively a problem bounding round, 
or a round for the purpose of narrowing the bounds of the problem to a 
proportion that could be handled by the relevant institutions. The act 
removed the decision authority from the local agencies and the CCC and 
vested sole state Licensing authority with the California Public Utilities 
Commission (cPUC), a regulator with a history of sympathy for utility 
capacity expansion. The act also gave the CCC the role of ranking alter- 
native sites, includmg the applied for site, but that ranking was not bind- 
ing upon the CPUC. Finally, the act required that the site be remote and 
onshore. 
The applicant's decision to reapply for the Point Conception site 
under the new process initiated the t h r d  round of political negotiations; 
this round was defined more narrowly than those preceding it. Essen- 
tially the only question open for the political agenda was "which site is 
appropriate?" While the CCC ranked Point Conception t h r d  out of its 
four top-ranked sites, the CPUC selected PC for conditional approval on 
the grounds that  the hgher-ranked sites would involve excessive delays 
as the applicant would have to draw up new plans. Again, the applicant 
(Western) was required to  submit a risk assessment to support its appli- 
cation (the Arthur D. Little consulting firm was commissioned to do this 
study). The CPUC approval was conditional on analysis of wind and wave 
conditions, archeological data, and, most importantly, seismic risk. At 
the federal level, where both the Oxnard and Point Conception sites 
remained "alive", a reorganization had replaced the FPC with two agen- 
cies: the Economic Regulatory Administration (ERA) in charge of import 
approval, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) in 
charge of site approval. The ERA approved the Indonesia import project. 
The FERC staff, which carried out detaded risk studies, favored Oxnard, 
but the Commissioners approved Point Conception to avoid a confronta- 
tion with the State which had legislated against the nonremote Oxnard 
site. 
Conditional approvals on the part of the three mandated decision 
makers, the CPUC, the ERA, and the FERC, did not however, resolve the 
siting issue. Opponents of the project petitioned a Federal Appellate 
Court for a stay in the proceedings on the grounds that not all seismic 
risk evidence had been considered. The Court has remanded the case 
back to the FERC. That ruling, and the subsequent procedures to investi- 
gate seismic risk set  up by the relevant agencies, has initiated the fourth 
round of discussions (see Table 1). 'Rus round is tightly defined as a 
technical risk issue. The single question open for discussion on the 
politic a1 agenda is whether Point Conception is seismically safe. 
C. SITING DECISIONS AS PUBLIC POLICY 
Policy analysis is often considered to be synonymous with rational 
decision making or problem solving. The course prescribed for the indivi- 
dual decision maker, that is, to identify his objectives, specify his alterna- 
tives, evaluate costs and benefits given h s  subjective estimates of uncer- 
tainty, and choose his preferred alternative, has been transposed to the 
public decision maker. This paradigm of policy as decision making or 
problem solving has been criticized on heuristic and institutional 
grounds. Majone (1981) gives three main reasons that differentiate the 
private from the public realm: First, in the public domain, decisions 
must be justified with seemingly objective arguments. Second, policies, 
unlike individual decisions, need to gain a consensus in order to be viable. 
Finally, public choices are not made by only one person. A consensus 
within and/or beyond an organization can be reached only with convinc- 
ing and institutionally appropriate arguments. 
An examination of the California siting process reveals that siting an 
LNG terminal is not a decision, in the decision-theoretic sense, but a pub- 
lic policy. A s  such, the political activities leadmg to the selection (prelim- 
inary) of Point Conception cannot be interpreted as goal-directed activl- 
ties, but rather as organizational output. Organizations often deal with 
current issues, not so much for their sake alone, but for their longer 
term implications for the institutions. Western, for instance, may have 
pursued a change in siting procedilres (S.lOBl), not so much because it 
perceived Oxnard to be blocked by local opposition, but because it recog- 
nized the longer term benefits of a one-stop licensing procedure. The Cal- 
ifornia State Legislature did not set a policy for remote siting as an 
analyst would prescribe, that is, making explicit the tradeoffs, but 
compromised instead among the pro- and the anti-Oxnard interests. The 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission also had to consider longer term 
implications of its siting policy as was evident in its strategy not to pur- 
sue its preference for Oxnard and thus provoke a Federal-State confron- 
tation. 
Another feature of the political sit= process that separates it from 
the accepted view of rational decision making is the sequential nature of 
the decisions. In California, resolution of the question whether a site was 
needed necessarily preceded the site selection phase.3 which in turn will 
precede the licensing process. Because of time and cost considerations, 
a decision on one level is often binding in that it cannot easily be reo- 
pened for political debate. Thus the process becomes tied or locked into 
certain courses of action. The responsible agencies have little alternative 
but to consider increasmgly narrow aspects of the problem. As a case in 
point, during the seven-year course of the California proceedings, the 
need for imported natural gas in the State diminished greatly.4 Instead 
of reexamining this need, the process is locked into a commitment for an 
import facility. Currently, all efforts are directed toward pursuing the 
narrower problem of seismic risk at  Point Conception. 
'~n the first round, the questions of need and site were considered simultaneously. This, 
however, did not lead to a-decision on site. In the second round, the State Legislature effec- 
p l y  resolved the need question. 
Gas prices were deregulated during this time which increased the domestic supply of natur- 
al gas. 
Tempting as it may be to step backwards through the policy- 
decisions appearing throughout the California case in order to set out 
explicitly the tradeoffs made by the responsible organizations, such an 
exercise would only be meaningful to the extent that siting policies lit the 
paradigm of rational decision making. That this was not the case is evi- 
dent from the sequential nature of the decisions and the operating pro- 
cedures of the organizations whlch were concerned with a wider policy 
context than the Oxnard decision. 
During the course of events in the California LNG terminal siting 
debate, there were seven major risk assessments carried out for the 
three prospective sites: Los Angeles, Oxnard and Point Conception. To 
understand the role these assessments played in the process, as well as in 
the outcome of the debate, it is instructive to review their content and 
use. An important point of this paper is to demonstrate that the content 
of such a study is largely determined by the use of the study in the politi- 
cal debate. It is only with an understanding of the latter that recommen- 
dations can be made for improving the former. 
For the sake of brevity, and with no loss in generality, we will limit 
our discussion to the early studies concerning only the Oxnard site. These 
studies, the Science Applications, Inc., risk assessment (SAI 1975), the 
Federal Power Commission risk assessment (FPC 1976), and the Socio- 
Economic Systems risk assessment (SES 1976) will be discussed in turn. 
A. AN OVERVIEW 
I .  Sc ience  A p p l i c a t i o n s ,  I n c . ,  Risk: A s s e s s m e n t  
As part of its case for the Federal Power Commission, the applicant 
commissioned a consulting firm, Science Applications, Inc. (SAI), to do a 
risk assessment of its proposed Oxnard terminal. That risk assessment 
was completed December 1975. It was quite elaborate, involving calcula- 
tions of probabilities of vessel accidents, tank ruptures, LNG spill sizes, 
methane cloud dispersion and ignition, and the resulting fatalities. The 
computer model developed for cloud dispersion was deemed one of the 
two best in a Coast Guard review of several models (Havens 1977). S h p  
collision calculations also involved a computer model, calibrated to statis- 
tics from several harbors. 
The SAI results were presented in the form of several different 
indices of risk. Individual annual probabilities of fatality due to the ter- 
minal were presented in the format of iso-probability contour maps of the 
site (see Figure 1). Those probabilities ranged from a maximum of 
1.5.10-~ near the terminal to less than 10-lo beyond three miles for the 
most conservative (risk-overstating) set of assumptions. Other contour 
maps were presented for less conservative assumption sets. The max- 
imum individual probability of LNG fatality was compared to other risks: 
The individual probability of dylng in a fire generally was reported as 220 
times greater; the maximum probability of having a plane fall on a person 
in the site vicinity was reported as 10 times greater than the LNG risk. 
Annual probabilities of catastrophes were also presented, including 10" 
for a 2,000 to 10,000 fatality year, and 1.4.10-~?, or "one chance in 710 

septendecillion," for the maximum catastrophe: 1 13,000 fatalities. For 
comparative purposes, another study was cited that gave the probability 
of a 32,000-fatality plane crash (into a race track) as lo-'*, five times 
greater than the probability of 2,000 to 10,000 LNG fatalities (for a dif- 
ferent set of assumptions than that used to get the lo-' number above). 
The study concluded that LNG risks at  the Oxnard site were "extremely 
low. " 
The results of the SAI study seem to have been accepted and inter- 
preted as intended in the FPC hearing. The FPC decision of July, 1977, 
cited all the various numbers mentioned above and a few more, noted the 
conservative assumptions, pointed out that no party disputed the find- 
ings ,  and found that the Oxnard site involved levels of risk sufficiently low 
for FPC approval. However, t h s  decision had no bearing on the siting pro- 
cess, as shortly thereafter a federal reorganization abolished the FPC and 
set up a new approval procedure. 
2. Fede~a l  P w e ~  C o m m . i s s i a  Staff Risk Assessment 
The staff of the FPC also performed a risk assessment as part of the 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) to be presented to  the Commis- 
sion in the July, 1977, hearing. The assessment was completed in 
November, 1976. This assessment generally used less elaborate models 
and less resources than SAT in reaching its conclusions. The logic of the 
report can be stated quite simply: All significant risks were seen as aris- 
ing from s h p  accidents. While that is plausible for technical reasons, the 
assessment did not defend that assumption with analysis. Those 
accidents were assumed to happen at last as far from shore as the end of 
the 0000 ft (1.0krn) trestle of the Oxnard facility. Since the FPC staff 
determined that the maximum travel of the flammable vapor cloud and 
maximum distance of significant fire radiation effects were both less than 
6000 feet, the risk was deemed to be "negligible." 
The FPC assessment results included risk measures for the Point 
Conception and Los Angeles sites. In all three cases, risk was measured 
by two indices: annual expected fatalities and annual individual probabil- 
ity of LNG fatality. However, for the reasons discussed above no numbers 
were given for those indices for Oxnard, only the abbreviation for "negligi- 
ble". The report concluded that ship transport to the Oxnard site 
"constitute[s] an acceptable risk to the public." 
A s  with the SAI study, the results of the FPC staff assessment seem 
to have been accepted at  the FPC hearing. The decision of July, 1977, 
cites both the F'PC and SAI results in support of its conclusions already 
discussed. 
3. Socin- Economic Systems Risk Assessment 
As part of its Environmental Impact Report process, the city of 
Oxnard commissioned a consulting firm, Socio-Economic Sys tems, Inc. 
(SES), to do a risk assessment of the LNG terminal. That assessment was 
completed in September 1976. It took a much broader look at the prob- 
lem than the previous two assessments. Rather than characterize the 
risk solely in probabilistic terms, the report presented 26 "population 
risk scenarios," with maps of the Oxnard area with shaded maximum 
plume areas or fire radiation zones superimposed, for each of several 
wind directions, spill sizes, etc. (see Figure 2). Each scenario named a 
"population risk," in fact the number of people covered by the maximum 
plume or fire zone, which ranged from 0 to 70,000. These scenarios could 
be described (though SES did not) as maximum credible accidents. They 
were not accompanied by any estimates of their probabilities, though 
those would have to be quite low for the large fatality scenarios for techn- 
ical reasons. 
In the section immediately following the scenarios, the SES report 
presented a more probabilistic analysis, which in fact combined numbers 
and assumptions from the SAI and FPC studies and a Coast Guard study. 
I t  basically combined the most conservative assumptions and nurnbe rs of 
each of the studies. In tabulating these, the report pointed out wide 
differences in numbers used in different studies. For example, the FPC 
used a probability of ship collision more than 5600 times larger than the 
one used by SAI. The number of expected fatalities per year computed in 
this way was 5.74, or 380 times larger than the SAI estimate. These 
numbers (SES and SAI estimates) were compared with expected fatalities 
from other hazards. While by the SAI estimate LNG has 7 times more 
expected fatahties than a hypothetical Oxnard nuclear plant, by the SES 
estimate LNG has 2900 times more expected fatalities. 
The SES report also plotted annual probabilities of catastrophes 
against the numbers of fatalities involved, for the SAI and SES estimates, 
and other hazards for comparison (see Figure 3). Once again, the SAI 
estimates for LNG were higher than the numbers for a nuclear plant, 
while the SES estimates were much hgher still. The SES report also 




























